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DECRIMINALIZING
TO OLIPHANT

TRIBAL CODES: A RESPONSE

Catherine Baker Stetson*
Introduction

When the Supreme Court held that tribes do not have criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation, chaos reigned in
many Indian communities, and the ramifications for tribal
sovereignty were tremendous. Several means for dealing with
these issues have been suggested, some perhaps have been tried,
but to date no solution has emerged as a completely satisfactory
answer to the question, "What do we do now?" This is probably
because there is no satisfactory response to such a dilemma.
This paper is offered to provide a background discussion and
analysis of the Supreme Court decision and its ramifications;
more important, it attempts to examine the available alternatives,
specifically that of decriminalizing certain tribal code provisions
in an effort to extend civil jurisdiction into areas that often need
and invite tribal control. An analysis of the distinctions between
civil and criminal offenses and penalties is necessary before any
such revision of tribal codes can begin, and the application of
such an analysis to the specific needs and powers of individual
tribes must be made carefully and with concern for a variety of
factors.
I.

The Decision

For almost one hundred years, the federal courts have had
jurisdiction over enumerated major crimes committed by Indians
on the reservation,' as well as over certain federal crimes, unless
* B.A. 1970, Vassar; M.A. 1972, Brown; Ph.D. 1977, New Mexico; J.D. 1981,
New Mexico.
1. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-53 (1976) defines federal criminal jurisdiction, including
federal enclave law. Specifically, the General Crimes Act, § 1152, provided for certain exception:
"This section shall not extend to offenses committed by one Indian against the person
or property of another Indian, nor to any Indian committing any offense in the Indian
country who has been punished by the local law of the tribe, or to any case where, by
treaty stipulations, the exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses is or may be secured to
the Indian tribes respectively."
The Major Crimes Act, §§ 1153, 3242, took jurisdiction over specified major offenses
committed by Indians on the reservation.
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specifically exempted by treaty.' Jurisdiction over minor offenses

committed by Indians remains in the tribe unless it has given up
such jurisdiction 3 or has lost it through the force of Public Law
280." Tribal civil jurisdiction remains intact to date and may be
exercised over non-Indians and Indians.'
Prior to Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,' tribal criminal

jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation was thought by
many to be a valid exercise of tribal sovereignty.' Though certain
tribal codes voluntarily relinquished such jurisdiction over nonIndians,' other tribes quietly assumed their powers, arresting and
fining violators of the tribal codes, whether the violators were
tribal members or not.' Case law on the validity of such assumption of jurisdiction was virtually nonexistent, as tribal courts and
codes are comparatively recent products, and most tribes have
not had the need, the desire, nor the ability to exercise their
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians until recently.' 0 Against
this jurisdictional backdrop, a disturbance on the Port Madison
Indian Reservation led to the infamous Oliphant decision,
creating confusion and dangers more disturbing than even the
uncertainty that had preceded them.
2. Exemptions from federal power, provided by treaties, apparently no longer exist.
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 365 (1942) [hereinafter cited as COHEN]. See generally
1978 Solicitor's Opinion quoted in 5 Indian L. Rptr. H-10.
3. See, e.g., Treaty with the Wiandot, 7 Stat. 16 (1785) and Treaty with the
Cherokee, 7 Stat. 18 (1785).
4. 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1976), 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976), and other scattered sections.
5. See text accompanying notes 84-116 infra.
6. 435 U.S. 191 (1978).

See F. COHEN,

7. See, e.g., AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYER TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW (1976) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]; 1 FINAL REPORT OF THE AMERICAN IN.
DIAN POLICY REVIEW COMMISSION 114, 117, 152-54 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL
REPORT].
8. See, e.g., Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 411 (9th Cir. 1976);
Hearingson the ConstitutionalRights of the American Indian Before the Subcomm. on
ConstitutionalRights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 3,
at 679 (1963) and pt. 2, at 385 (1963).
9. "Of the 127 reservation court systems that currently exercise criminal jurisdiction in the United States, 33 purport to extend that jurisdiction to non-Indians. Twelve
other Indian tribes have enacted ordinances which would permit the assumption of
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians." Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S.
191, 196 (1978); H.R. REP. No. 474, 23d Cong., Ist Sess. 91 (1834); Note, Indian
Law-Indian Tribes Have No Inherent Authority to Exercise Criminal Jurisdiction Over
Non-Indians Violating Tribal Criminal Laws Within Reservation Boundaries, 28 CATH.
U.L. REV. 663, 664 n.4. (1978-1979); COHEN, supra note 2, at 6 n.45, 146 n.212; M.
PRICE, LAW AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN

173 (1973).

10. Oliphant v. Suquanish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 197, 201 (1978).
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The Port Madison Reservation "isa checkerboard of tribal
community land, allotted Indian lands, property held in fee simple by non-Indians, and various roads and public highways maintained by Kitsap County."" Furthermore, 63% of reservation
land is owned by approximately 3,000 non-Indians, while the remaining lands are held in trust for approximately 50 Suquamish
tribal members.' 2 Both Oliphant and Belgarde are non-Indians
and were arrested on the reservation.
In the fall of 1973, the Suquamish Tribe was celebrating the annual Chief Seattle Days on its reservation in Washington. During
the festivities, Oliphant was arrested by the tribal police and was
charged with resisting arrest and assaulting a tribal officer. He
was jailed and then released on his own recognizance by the tribal
court. Oliphant petitioned to the district court for a writ of
habeas corpus, which the district court denied. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial. At the same time, Belgarde
was arrested by the tribal police following a high-speed chase
through the reservation; the chase ended when Belgarde ran into
a tribal vehicle. He was released after posting bail but was later
charged with recklessly endangering another person and with
damaging tribal property. Belgarde's petition for a writ of habeas
corpus was also denied by the district court, and his appeal was
pending in the Ninth Circuit when the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to Oliphant.' 3
The issue raised by Belgarde and Oliphant was whether a tribal
court had criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on the reservation. The Supreme Court, in a 6-2 decision, held that it did not.'"
An analysis of the decision clearly indicates that the Court's
reasoning was poorly founded, even irrational, but the decision is
nevertheless binding, and the impact on tribes has been, and will
continue to be, enormous.
Following the decision, there has been a flurry of widespread
criticism, both of the holding itself and of the reasoning behind
it. The criticism has not been limited to the outrage of individual
tribes, but has been the inspiration for numerous law review articles and casenotes whose titles alone indicate the tenor of reac11. Id. at 193.
12. Id. at 193 n.1.
13. Id. at 194-95.
14. Id. Rehnquist, J., delivered the opinion; Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell, and
Stevens, JJ., joined. Marshall, J., dissented and Burger, C.J., joined in the dissent. Brennan, J., took no part in the decision.
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tions to Rehnquist's opinion. 5 His misuse of precedent and other
authority, his failure to apply traditional canons of construction,
his false assumptions and poor arguments have served as fertile
ground for criticism. Additionally, a look at international law
and at the rules governing conflict of laws only serves further to
buttress the convictions of many that Oliphant was shamefully
decided.
As the Ninth Circuit accurately pointed out, "the proper approach to the question of tribal criminal jurisdiction is to ask
'first, what the original sovereign powers of the tribes were, and,
then, how far and in what respects these powers have been
limited.'" "6 The court found that "the power to preserve order
on the reservation . . . is a sine-qua non of the sovereignty
[which] the Suquamish originally possessed," ' and that "no
treaty has deprived the Suquamish of criminal jurisdiction" over
non-Indians. 'I8
The principle of "reserved powers" to the tribes is commonly
accepted. 19 In the absence of express congressional withdrawal of
such powers, tribes are presumed to have retained them."0 While
it is interesting to note that the dissent in Oliphant based its argument exclusively on such principles, 2 ' Rehnquist clearly did not
feel compelled to acknowledge this well-established and significant body of case law and tradition. His finding that criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians was not reserved to the tribes "is a
new interpretation of Indian law and is difficult to resolve with
precedent."
A new standard of analysis-'"inconsistent with
their status"-emerged in Oliphant;23 "no established legal
authority exists at the present time for such a position, and,
significantly,
the majority makes no attempt to cite any precedent
' 24
for it."
15. Note, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe: A JurisdictionalQuagmire, 24 S.D.
L. REV. 217 (1979); Barsh & Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1978-79).

16. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976).
17.
18.
19.
30 U.S.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 1010.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
(5 Pet.) 1 (1831). See generally COHEN, supra note 2, at 121-22.
Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1009 (9th Cir. 1976).
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978) (dissent).

22. Note, Indians-Jurisdiction- Tribal Courts Lack Jurisdiction Over Non-Indian
Offenders, 1979 Wis. L. REV. 537, 540.
23. Id. at 559.
24. West, A Response, 5 Indian L. Rptr. M-20, M-23 (1978).
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Not only is such a premise unsupported by precedent, but it
undermines the principle of Indian sovereignty, also previously
well established. 2 In arriving at the new standard, Rehnquist
miscites United States v. Rogers,26 misinterprets judicial authority
(apparently unaware that Indian lands cannot acquire new or different status by simple unilateral declaration of the Supreme
Court),27 uses case law erroneously and out of context, 2 ignores
historical facts about federal dealings with tribes, 2 and relies on a
misinterpreted dissenting opinion in Fletcherv. Peck" for his sole
support of the new proposition.' The end result is an opinion
directly contradictory to many landmark Supreme Court decisions in the field of Indian law, from Worcester v. Georgia 2 and
United States v. Winans,33 to McClanahan v. Arizona Tax
Commission14 and Williams v. Lee. 3 1 Rehnquist's decision in
Oliphant is unable to be reconciled with an "evergrowing list of
twentieth century Supreme Court decisions, ' ' 36 including even his
own opinion in United States v. Mazurie,3 in which Rehnquist
himself pointed out that the tribes have the power to regulate
their own internal and social relations. 31 Clearly this is a power
one might assume would adhere to i sovereign, as it does in fact
adhere to both federal and state governments. A double standard
vis-a-vis the tribes is illogical, though apparently viewed by the
necessary, perhaps as a result of its
Supreme Court as politically
"egocentric predicament." 3 9 As Larson notes in his article on
Oliphant, a "glaring defect in the reasoning is apparently due to
Mr. Justice Rehnquist's confusion of the phrase 'forfeiture of full
sovereignty' with the totally different concept of 'full forfeiture
of sovereignty.' "10
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Note, supra note 9, at 676.
45 U.S. (4 How.) 567 (1846).
Note, supra note 9, at 677.
Id.
Id. at 678.
10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
Note, supra note 9, at 678-79.
31 U.S. 515 (1832).
198 U.S. 371 (1905). See also Note, supra note 15, at 229-30.
411 U.S. 165 (1973).
358 U.S. 217 (1959) See also Note, supra note 15, at 228-31.
Note, supra note 15, at 224.
419 U.S. 544 (1975).
Id. at 557.
Note, supra note 15, at 227-28.
Id.
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Though there is a recent trend toward less reliance on the notion of inherent sovereignty and more reliance on statutory and
treaty interpretation," the Supreme Court has noted that the doctrine of tribal sovereignty is nonetheless relevant, "not because it
provides a definitive resolution of the issues in this suit but
because it provides a backdrop against which the applicable
treaties and federal statutes must be read." 42 Since Rehnquist did
not find inherent sovereignty to be present, he was not obliged to
look to statutes or treaties to discover whether such sovereignty
had been limited. He did, nonetheless, and perhaps it would have
been better for the credibility of his opinion had he not.
Through the efforts of Rehnquist, Oliphant stands as a glaring
example of misuse of statutory and treaty law. At best, Rehnquist's
readings and applications are ambiguous; more frequently,
however, his conclusions fly in the face of logic, precedent, and
justice, apparently relying on the inevitable ensuing confusion to
cover the tracks.
Rehnquist- referred to the Western Territory Bill to support the
idea that there is no tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians,
when in fact the Bill provided for just such jurisdiction in certain
instances.4 3 Even if this were not so, precedent, as exemplified in
Winans, would require a clear congressional expression of intent
to deprive tribes of their power. More persuasively, "[e]ven if the
Court correctly interpreted legislative intent, the Western Territory Bill is nonetheless an unreliable 44
indicator of Congressional
policy because it was never enacted."
If Rehnquist were looking for congressional intent as an aid in
determining the status of tribal criminal jurisdiction, he would
have done well to refer to the reports of the American Indian
Policy Review Commission which, in 1977, concluded that "there
is an established legal basis for tribes to exercise jurisdiction over
non-Indians." 4 5 This Report also found that there is a clear need
for such jurisdiction on the reservations, and that, because of the
varied natures and needs of tribes, a uniform rule is not desirable.4 6
Rehnquist cited only to the lone dissent of the Report, however,
as support for his contention that Congress intended no such
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Note, supra note 9, at 671-72.
Id.
Note, supra note 22, at 546.
Note, supra note 9, at 680.
FINAL REPORT, supra note 7, at 154.
Id.
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jurisdictional power. 7 A more perverse use of authority cannot
readily be imagined.
Rehnquist's reliance on a 1960 Senate Report and a provision
in the 1854 amendments to the Trade and Intercourse Act for
support of his argument is equally questionable and far-fetched,
as the Senate Report cites no authority for its proposition, and
the amendments were in reaction to an isolated occurrence and
should not have been viewed as a comprehensive solution to all
tribal questions. 8
His use of case law was similarly flawed. Ex parte Kenyon
dealt specifically with the issue of tribal criminal jurisdiction over
non-Indians but was distinguishable in that the crime involved
was committed off-reservation. 4 9 Rehnquist latched on to dictum
in Kenyon, however, to prove his point that tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians on the reservation was 50also nonexistent, thus
elevating dictum to the status of holding.
This poor, but only, authority was at first glance supported by
a 1970 Solicitor's Opinion, 5 though Rehnquist clearly knew that
the Opinion had been withdrawn and had not been replaced, thus
rendering its inclusion useless if not misleading. Interestingly
enough, a 1934 Solicitor's Opinion had reached the opposite conclusion,5 2 and a memo from the Solicitor's Office, in 1975, indicated that the issue was far from settled, the majority of the
persuasive arguments tending to support tribal criminal jurisdiction."
In analogizing the issue in Oliphant to the policies controlling
the Major Crimes Act' 5 4 Rehnquist undercuts his own argument-that tribal court jurisdiction over non-Indians would
result in non-Indians being tried by tribal courts for major
crimes-by referring in a footnote to the Indian Civil Rights Act
that places limitations on the punishments tribes are allowed to
mete out. 5 Furthermore, it has never been conclusively established
47. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 205 n.15 (1978), quoting
supra note 7, at 587.
48. Note, supra note 9, at 680-81.
49. 14 F. Cas. 353 (C.C.W.D. Ark. 1878) (No. 7,720).
50. Note, supra note 9, at 682. See also Note, supra note 22, at 544.
51. 77 Int. Dec. 113 (1970).
52. 55 Int. Dec. 14, 57 (1934); Note, supra note 9, at 682.
53. Memo from Alan Palmer, Assistant Solicitor, to Lou Striegel, Special Assistant
to the Solicitor (Jan. 14, 1975), reprintedin 8 AM. INDIAN L. NEWS 31 (1975).
54. See note 1, supra.
55. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 204 n.14 (1978). See also
Note, supra note 15, at 231.
FINAL REPORT,
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that the Major Crimes Act provides for exclusive federal jurisdiction over the specified acts, and good arguments can be made for
the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction., At any rate, the Indian
Civil Rights Act explicitly protects Indians and non-Indians alike
from tribal court excesses, a logical inference being that the tribal
courts have jurisdiction over both."
Rehnquist's interpretation of treaties fared no better than his
interpretation of statutes. An initial discussion of four irrelevant
treaties (irrelevant because of the individual nature of all treaties
and because of their failure to be in any way binding upon the
Suquamish)5" served effectively to distract from Rehnquist's consideration of the Treaty of Point Elliot. Ignoring evidence of the
Suquamish's intent to retain criminal jurisdiction over nonIndians, 59 he proceeded with a lopsided construction of the treaty
provisions in an effort to establish that tribal recognition of its
dependence upon the federal government was tantamount to
relinquishment of tribal jurisdiction. Such an assumption is not
clearly, logically, or inevitably mandated by the treaty language,
which may just as easily have contemplated concurrent federaltribal jurisdiction in this area, 60recognizing only a trade
dependence upon the United States.
In addition, the failure of the tribe to raise jurisdictional questions or to assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that such jurisdiction did not
and could not exist; rather, the failure is readily explainable in
light of the fact that, at the time of the treaty-making, such
jurisdiction was not being exercised and was not viewed as
necessary. 6 ' Congressional silence may merely indicate a lack of
occasion to consider the question.6 2 Rehnquist's specific reference
to one clause in the treaty (which he holds up as clear evidence of
tribal relinquishment of its jurisdiction) depends on an unlikely
interpretation of the clause that appears more obviously to be an
extradition clause, in no way inconsistent with the exercise of
tribal criminal jurisdiction over all persons on the reservation.6 3
When the Ninth Circuit turned to the statutes and treaties for
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Note,
Id.at
Note,
Id.at
Note,
Id. at
Id. at
Note,

supra note 22, at 545-50.
553; Note, supra note 9, at 681.
supra note 9, at 684.
682-83 n.113.
supra note 22, at 542-43.
542.
547-48.
supra note 9, at 683; Note, supra note 22, at 543.
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analysis of the issue, it stated that its "approach is influenced by
the long-standing rule that 'legislation affecting the Indians is to
be construed in their interest."'6 Using such an approach, the
court's consideration of the treaty, statutes, and case law resulted
in an unwavering assertion of tribal criminal jurisdiction. 6 Rehnquist's analysis of the treaties clearly ignored the accepted canons
of construction as applied to federal-tribal relations.
In addition to a negative analysis of Rehnquist's opinion in
Oliphant, more positive approaches to the issues of tribal
sovereignty and criminal jurisdiction are to be found in the
precepts of international law and conflict of laws. International
law upholds the Indians' right of self-determination and sovereignty, and federal law to the contrary is in violation of such international law." There are numerous reasons for according
tribal interests persuasive weight in resolving the inevitable
jurisdictional conflicts that result from a forced coexistence of
different sovereigns. 67 Decisions such as Oliphant not only are
harmful in their undermining of their own authority and precedent and of the authority of tribal governments, but they also ignore established tenets of international law and conflict of laws,
thus weakening the persuasiveness of arguments and traditions
only tangentially related to tribal law.
The Ninth Circuit was perceptive enough to foresee some of
the reasons why tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians on
the reservation was necessary, not the least of which was that exemplified by the Oliphant fact situation itself. Without criminal
authority over all persons on the reservation, there would be no
law enforcement or protection available. 68 This, in turn, the court
supposed, would lead to increased migration of Indians off the
69
reservation, in counteraction to expressed congressional policy.
Furthermore, the court noted, federal law is not designed to handle a wide range of conduct and minor offenses; surely someone
64. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1976) (citing United States v.
Nice, 241 U.S. 591, 599 (1916)).
65. Id.

66. Clinebell, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native Americans
Under International Law, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 669 (1978).
67. McCoy, The Doctrine of Tribal Sovereignty: Accommodating Tribal, State, and
Federal Interests, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375 (1978).
68. AMERICAN INDIAN LAWYERS TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., INVESTIGATIVE HEARINGS
ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN INDIAN COUNTRY 74 (1980) [hereinafter cited as
HEARINGS]; 5 Indian L. Rptr. M-26.
69. Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1013 (9th Cir. 1978).
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has to, and states, their courts, and their laws are certainly not
the appropriate answer.7" Ill feelings and antagonism between
tribes and surrounding states preclude any sincere expectations
that justice could or would be done through assertion of state
jurisdiction over criminal activity on reservations. 7 ' The conclusion that came logically to the Ninth Circuit was to acknowledge
tribal jurisdiction, thus allowing for continued dignity of the tri-2
bal governments while ensuring prosecution of lawless behavior.1
Not only does the holding in Oliphant impede self-determination and express congressional policy," it also raises serious questions about denial of equal protection rights to Indians. 4 It encourages racial ill-will and, potentially, violence;" it ensures inefficient
prosecution and resultant lawlessness; and it poses innumerable
difficulties in restructuring federal procedures.76 Other areas of
litigation, such as taxation, well settled and workable before
Oliphant, are liable to be reexamined and relitigated,
further
7
complicating and upsetting federal-tribal relations .
One positive effect of Oliphant, according to some, is that it
may spur Congress to effect curative legislation in the area of
tribal criminal jurisdiction. Certainly such legislation would be
able to offset Oliphant and is the most obvious and ultimate of
solutions. 78 However, there are numerous difficulties involved in
approaching Congress about the problem, and there is no assurance, even if Congress legislates, that it will restore tribal criminal
jurisdiction over non-Indians. Restoration may be only partial,
and there is always the possibility that Congress will instead provide statutory backup for Oliphant. At any rate, a congressional
enactment will take a long time, and tribes are concerned about
how to deal with their problems now, on a day-to-day basis.
Several solutions have been proposed as a means of dealing
with Oliphant. One is to attempt to apply substantive tribal law
(instead of state law) under the Assimilative Crimes Act through
70.
H-10.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. See also Solicitor's Opinion (Apr. 10, 1978), reprintedin 5 Indian L. Rptr.

supra note 68, at 73-74; 5 Indian L. Rptr. H-I1.
Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007, 1014 (9th Cir. 1978).
Note, supra note 22, at 563.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 565.
76. Id. at 565-69; TASK FORCE FOUR, FINAL REPORT ON FEDERAL,
JURISDICTION 124-29 (1976).
77. Note, supra note 15, at 241-42.
78. Id. at 242; Note, supra note 22, at 569.
HEARINGS,
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the General Crimes Act. Such an attempt may meet with resistance, as it is not at all clear that the Assimilative Crimes Act can
be construed to allow such an application. Furthermore, there are
logistical, political, and emotional problems with exercising
federal jurisdiction over misdemeanors and petty offenses. 9
Another alternative would be through the courts. To attempt
to limit Oliphantto its facts is one option. Though the argument
can rationally be made, given Oliphant's extremely skewed fact
situation, the breadth of the decision probably will prevent such
an argument from prevailing." Moreover, even though an argument to the effect that tribal criminal jurisdiction should be allowed
where the reservation is predominantly Indian-inhabited and
Indian-held may prevail, those tribes with a large amount of fee
land and non-Indian inhabitants would not be any better off than
before; the injustice and incongruity of selective jurisdictional
powers would probably increase the Court's reluctance to limit
Oliphant to its facts.
The better option available through the courts would be to
send up a better fact situation and ask that Oliphant be expressly
overruled. Aside from the ethical considerations involved with
sending up an issue that has been so broadly, recently, and emphatically decided, the likelihood of success is small. A newer
decision may be better analyzed and better supported, but the
result, given the racial and political realities, would probably be
the same, and we can do without a good opinion supporting
Oliphant.
A solution that emerges as more practical is to work within the
confines established by Oliphant; that is, to exercise those powers
not removed by the Court. The tribal exclusionary powers, particularly against habitual offenders, may be used to remove those
non-Indians whose presence or actions are particularly offensive
to tribal life and well-being." Injunctive powers may be exercised,
for example, in the areas of business and waste regulation,
perhaps on a nuisance theory. And finally, civil penalties and
even forfeitures may be imposed through regulation of such areas
previously defined as criminal, e.g., trespass, traffic violations, illegal hunting and fishing, littering, and the like. For this final
79. Note, supra note 15, at 240.
80. West, supra note 24, at M-23.
81. Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S: (6 Pet.)
515 (1832); Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976); OrtizBarraza v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975).
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solution to be effective, tribal codes would have to be revised,
and several factors would have to be considered in order to ensure that courts would uphold the restructured tribal jurisdiction.
It must be clear from the start what powers still remain with the
tribes, and also how they are to go about revising substantive and
procedural law in order to stay within the purview of such
powers.
II.

The Leftovers: Tribal Civil Jurisdiction

It is relatively clear that tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over
civil affairs and minor criminal offenses between members, and
states have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes between nonIndians. 82 What remains of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonIndians, in the wake of Oliphant, is less clear.
For some observers, the proposition that tribes retain civil
jurisdiction over non-Indians is not a settled one. A question can
be raised about the Court's dictum, which stated that the Indian
Civil Rights Act would apply to non-Indians only "if and when
they come under a tribe's criminal or civil jurisdiction either by
treaty provision or by Act of Congress." 83 The inference is that
the Oliphant rationale may be applicable to civil as well as to
criminal jurisdiction. Still, the presumption should be that the
tribes retain civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, and this authority
has been frequently and repeatedly upheld.1 4 Since Oliphant addressed itself specifically and only to the issue of criminal
jurisdiction, no intimation, either express or implied, should be
seen as curtailing civil jurisdiction. Especially given the aberrational nature of Rehnquist's opinion, the argument is that his
holding cannot be extended beyond its clear and explicit holding."
That tribes are still considered independent sovereigns with
powers of self-government was reaffirmed in United States v.
Wheeler,86 only two weeks after Oliphant was decided. In Buster
v. Wright, the court held that the Creek Nation had the authority,
as a sovereign, to regulate business transactions within its
82. See generallyAMERICAN INDIAN LAWYERS TRAINING PROGRAM, INC., MANUAL OF
§§ F, H.
83. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 195-96 n.6 (1978).
84. See Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905); text accompanying notes
87-117, infra.
85. West, supra note 24, at M-23.
86. 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
INDIAN CRIMINAL JURISDICTION,
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borders, even for nonmembers. 7 Such an authority was termed a
"natural right," inherent, and independent of title. 8
In Williams v. Lee, 89 the Supreme Court disallowed the state of
Arizona from exercising civil jurisdiction over actions arising between Indians and non-Indians on the reservation. Williams
stated as rationale the reluctance to undermine tribal authority
and to infringe upon a tribe's right to self-government. Since
Williams, courts have frequently addressed the question of
"whether the state action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by them," 90 in analyzing tribal-state conflicts or jurisdiction and legislation. Since
1959, it appears
[that] exclusive Indian jurisdiction exists when an action involves
a proprietary interest in Indian land; or when an Indian sues
another Indian on a claim for relief recognized only by tribal
custom and law; or, subject to the Fourteenth Amendment
argument, when an Indian is suing or being sued by another Indian or non-Indian over an occurrence or transaction arising in
Indian country about which the Tribe does, or foreseeably will,
in the exercise of its police power, assume sovereign control
through tribal law, court, or executive action. 9 '
Tribal civil authority has been upheld in a variety of areas,
from taxation and regulation to domestic affairs and child
custody. The Williams infringement test has frequently been the
measure of who may exercise authority-tribe or state. Clearly it
is in the tribal interest to be able to control such areas as use of
peyote on the reservation, 92 regulation of tribal elections,9 3 exercise of extradition powers,9" litigation of contract obligations,9 5

87. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905).
88. Id. at 950.
89. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
90. Id. at 220.
91. Ransom, Indians-CivilJurisdictionin New Mexico-State, Federaland Tribal
Courts, 1 N.M. L. REV. 196, 211 (1971).
92. Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir.
1959).
93. Motah v. United States, 402 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1968).
94. Arizona ex rel. Merrill v. Turtle, 413 F.2d 683 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 1003 (1970).
95. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
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and tort actions.9 6 But in civil areas involving non-Indian
litigants, the tribes also have an interest.
In Fisher v. District Court,97 tribal laws governing adoption
were held to be exclusive when litigation arose on the reservation.
State courts have occasionally taken jurisdiction over child
custody cases involving an Indian child, 98 but only when the
domicile of the child was found to be off-reservation. 9 9 Tribal
law governing domestic relations has also been held to be valid 0 0
if not exclusive,' 0' partly depending on whether the tribe in question has affirmatively undertaken to govern the area at issue, and
whether individual members have voluntarily brought the action
in a state court.
In holding that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to interfere with tribal regulation of membership, the Court in Santa
ClaraPueblo v. Martinez noted that "tribal courts have repeatedly
been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive jurisdicand property intion of disputes affecting important personal
02
terests of both Indians and non-Indians."
While the ability of tribes to tax non-Indians, their businesses,
and their lands within reservation boundaries has not been
conclusively defined, the tribes are allowed to tax non-Indian
lessees,'0 3 cigarette sales,104 and business activities,1'o though the

authority to do so has not always been found to be exclusive. 106
Tribal exclusionary powers, for the most part reserved by tribes
in individual treaties, was first held to be valid in Morris v. Hitchcock. 0 7 Subsequently, dictum in other cases has indicated that
96. Schantz v. White Lightning, 231 N.W.2d 812 (N.D. 1975) Cf. Paiz v. Hughes, 76
N.M. 562, 417 P.2d 51 (1966) (concurrent jurisdiction).
97. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
98. In re Adoption of Doe, 89 N.M. 606, 555 P.2d 906 (Ct. App. 1976).
99. Cf. Wakefield v. Littlelight, 276 Md. 333, 347 A.2d 228 (1975).
100. Whyte v. District Court, 140 Colo. 334, 346 P.2d 1012 (1959), cert. denied, 363
U.S. 829 (1960).
101. Bad Horse v. Bad Horse, 163 Mont. 445, 517 P.2d 893 (1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 847 (1974).
102. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65 (1978).
103. Fort Mojave Tribe v. County of San Bernadino, 543 F.2d 1253 (9th Cir. 1976)
(by implication), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 983 (1977).
104. Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S.
134 (1980).
105. Maxey v. Wright, 54 S.W. 807, aff'd 105 F. 1003 (8th Cir. 1900).
106. See generally Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89 (8th Cir. 1956);
MANUAL, supra note 7, at § 1.
107. 194 U.S. 384 (1904).
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the power to expel violators of tribal codes and to deliver offenders to the appropriate authorities is still effective. 108 Though
Oliphant raises a question as to the continuing validity of such
authority, Williams v. Lee, federal treaties, and pure practicality
would indicate that the exclusionary power is still operative.
The area of fishing and hunting regulation is currently in a
state of flux. The general rule seems to be that even in the
absence of a treaty provision on the subject of hunting, fishing,
water, timber, and mineral rights, the tribe reserves such rights,
absent a clear congressional statement to the contrary." 9 Even in
Public Law 280 states, the courts have not allowed state jurisdiction over hunting and fishing, though this does not prevent states
from attempting to assert it." 0 Though some courts have held the
Indians' rights to be exclusive,"' and other courts have held the
states' rights to be exclusive," 2 the American Indian Policy
Review Commission indicates that congressional intent requires
tribal consent for non-Indians to go on reservations to hunt and
fish.' The issue of tribal authority to regulate off-reservation is
even more tenuous, though it has been held to exist.""
Tribes may be limited as to how far their fish and game ordinances apply because of provisions in their own constitutions
which limit their jurisdiction to members or to Indians, and
there may be treaties or legislation which limit their powers or
allow the importation of state laws. But generally it appears
that the trend, and the better view, is that tribal laws apply to
Indians and non-Indians alike who are hunting and fishing within the boundaries of an Indian reservation. This application
would lead to the exclusion of state laws except when the tribe
itself requires that non-Indians comply with state regulations as
they have in some situations." 5
The United States Supreme Court has said that tribes may
regulate hunting and fishing on the reservation and that such
108. Quechan Tribe of Indians v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1976); Ortiz-Barraza
v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176 (9th Cir. 1975).
109. United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
110.

TASK FORCE FOUR,

supra note 76, at 60.

Il1. Id. at 65-67.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 66, 243, 245.
114. Id. at 74. See also Settler v. Lameer, 507 F.2d 231 (9th Cir. 1974);
supra note 7, at § G; PRICE, supra note 9, at 199-331.
115. TASK FORCE FOUR, supra note 76, at 246.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981

MANUAL,

AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 9

regulations apply equally to Indians and non-Indians. However,
the Court noted the presence of limitations on
such power with
16
regard to fee lands within tribal boundaries.'
Though much of the controversy concerning the extent of
tribal control and jurisdiction over non-Indians has yet to be settled, there is at least a solid body of law and treaty interpretation
that indicates that in several civil areas tribes do have jurisdiction,
whether concurrent with or exclusive of state jurisdiction.
Though criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians is no longer functional for tribes, decriminalization of certain activities may be a
viable solution for such tribes as wish to continue (or begin) control over certain areas of activity on the reservation. If hunting
and fishing, minor offenses, business, waste, tribal ranges, and
food service, for example, can be controlled by a civil code and
can be seen to fall within Williams's infringement parameters,
tribes may at least partially circumvent many of the problems
posed by the Oliphant decision. Such a decriminalization process,
however, will undoubtedly be closely scrutinized by both federal
and state courts, and serious tribal efforts must be made to ensure that any new civil codes do not seek merely to substitute the
word "civil" for the word "criminal" wherever it appears. Instead, a
thorough revision of the codes is required in order to bring the
new regulations within constitutional and practicable guidelines.
III.

The Fine Line

Recently there have been numerous attempts to decriminalize
certain behavior and to substitute civil penalties for criminal
penalties in order to make legal enforcement proceedings more
efficient." 7 Though state and federal motivation in so doing is
different from that of tribes that wish to decriminalize activities
for purposes of retaining control over certain behavior on the
reservation, the problems encountered are much the same. Certainly, nominal semantic change in laws is insufficient to make
civil an erstwhile criminal offense; yet just what the distinction is
between criminal and civil offenses is unclear.
The Supreme Court has been notoriously inconsistent, or at
best enigmatic, in its analysis of the distinction. For purposes of
selectively applying constitutional safeguards, the Court has
116. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
117. Charney, The Need for ConstitutionalProtectionsfor Defendants in CivilPenalty

Cases, 59

CORNELL

L.

REV.

478, 482 n.29 (1974).

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol9/iss1/3

1981]

DECRIMINALIZING TRIBAL CODES

issued a series of opinions in which the same sanction was held to
be punitive on one hand and remedial (or civil) on the other." 8
Clearly, all laws that function primarily to punish are criminal," 19
but just what constitutes a punitive sanction remains difficult to
discern. In order to determine whether a law serves primarily to
punish, it is necessary to determine what punishment is, as well as
what the legislature intended when it imposed a particular sanction; both analyses have their drawbacks.
Professor Hart has defined punishment in terms of five,
possibly six, elements: (1) it must involve pain; (2) it must be a
response to an offense against the rules; (3) it must be imposed
upon one who breaks the rules; (4) it must be intentionally administered by others; and (5) it must be imposed by a legal
authority with jurisdiction over the offense. 20 In order to
distinguish punishment from civil remedies (which have as their
objectives compensation, regulation, or treatment), Hart suggests
a sixth element, that the punishment must be imposed primarily
of prevention of rule breaking or of retribution after
as a means
2
the fact.
The sixth element is perhaps the most useful in distinguishing
between criminal and civil sanctions, as, to some extent, the first
five elements apply equally well to both. If punishment is viewed
as having as its objective the "dominant purpose of retribution,
meaning the desire to hurt a law violator for no reason but
revenge, or deterrence, meaning the desire to influence his future
conduct or that of others who fear similar hurt, 22 a workable
distinction between criminal and civil penalties begins to emerge.
Several tests have been developed in an attempt to elaborate on
the distinction, the most commonly used set forth in Kennedy v.
Mendoza-Martinez.'23 Various courts have applied the Kennedy
test, adding to and subtracting from it, placing varying degrees of
emphasis on each of the enumerated seven factors124 :
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or
restraint,
118. Clark, Civil and CriminalPenaltiesand Forfeitures:A Frameworkfor Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379, 382 (1976).
119. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
120. Clark, supra note 118, at 431.
121. Id. at 432.
122. Id. at 384.
123. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).

124. Ludwig, ConstitutionalLaw- The Oregon Supreme Court Reaches First Base in
Defining a Crime, 57 OR. L. REv. 602, 610 (1978).
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whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment,
whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter,
whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of
punishment-retribution and deterrence,
whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime,
whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be
connected is assignable to it, and
whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative
purpose assigned .... 125
Applying such a test is not without its problems, however, and
the effort to clarify the fine line between criminal and civil sanctions frequently serves only to obscure it. For example, because
all sanctions in effect impose an affirmative disability, the first
test is virtually useless without a clearer definition of punishment
and restraint. 26 Also, because many sanctions have traditionally
served in both criminal and civil capacities, and because it is the
borderline, quasi-criminal sanctions that are primarily the source
of controversy, the second and fifth tests are not as useful as they
could be, perhaps, if considered along with further evidence of its
purposive objective. 27 The analysis leads quickly into circuitous
reasoning because many activities that occur and need to be
regulated or punished today did not exist at common law and
therefore do not have a traditional definition or status. In addition, an act that is a tort in one jurisdiction may be a crime in
another, the difference being only in the nature of the penalty imposed.' 28 To attempt to distinguish whether a specific act is a
crime or a civil wrong, based on the penalty attached, is a common test, yet presents a vicious circle when the question is
whether the act is inherently a civil or criminal offense. Though
historical status of an offense may be useful in analyzing the
nature of the offense today, it is, in many ways, defeating contemporary efforts at change, reevaluation, and modification, and
as such presumes the usefulness, validity, and universal nature of
an often obsolete and inefficient status quo.
A purposive approach, based on test four, is useful for analyzing the obvious, but is much less useful in analyzing areas in
which civil and criminal goals overlap. Though retribution is
125. Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963).
126. Clark, supra note 118, at 455.

127. Id. at 456. See generally, Gausewitz, Criminal Law-Reclassification of Certain
Offenses as Civil Instead of Criminal, 12 Wis. L. REV. 365 (1937).
128. Note, Public Torts, 35 HARV. L. REV. 462, 463 n.10 (1922).
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more obviously founded in the quest for vengeance, and is thus
more likely to be penal in nature, it is uniformly to be desired
that any violator of any code cease and desist from his activity
and that he refrain from recommencing it in the future. As such,
the presence of a deterrent effect of a sanction would not
necessarily mean much. 21 9 The test needs further elaboration, and
many suggestions have been offered.
The distinction between general and specific deterrence
determines whan a sanction is criminal or civil. An injury inflicted on an individual or group of individuals as a result of
previous actions of those individuals and aimed at preventing a
recurrence of those actions by those individuals serves a
specific deterrent function. A loss inflicted on a person or
group of persons in order to control, by example, future conduct of all persons in the society regardless of past actions of
the group serves as a general deterrent. If imposition of the loss
is triggered by the undesired conduct, it is criminal in nature.
However, when the loss is inflicted merely to mold future actions and the group suffering the loss is30 rationally classified,
then the loss is not a criminal sanction.1
The test of whether an offense requires scienter is proposed
under the assumption that if scienter is required for conviction,
the offense is criminal, but if it is not required, the offense is
civil. Unfortunately, there are numerous criminal statutes that
impose absolute and vicarious liability, even in the absence of
penalty
mens rea,'3 ' and further, there is nothing that says a civil
32
cannot be imposed even though scienter is required.
The final two tests address themselves to the appropriateness
of the sanction and are primarily useful when applied in conjunction with other tests indicating legislative purpose. The Supreme
Court has frequently supplemented its analysis of quasi-criminal
statutes by inquiring into the legislative background materials.
This approach involves a number of considerations; it has several
drawbacks and seems to serve primarily to weigh constitutional
protections against government interests.
"Finding a statute's 'purpose' does not usually involve inquiry
into legislator's 'motives."' The courts determine "purpose"
129.
130.
131.
132.

Clark, supra note 118, at 456; Ludwig, supra note 124, at 608 n.38.
Charney, supra note 117, at 510.
Id. at 495.
Gausewitz, supra note 127, at 366.
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by deciding first whether a law can be suspected more or less
strongly of serving constitutionally improper goals, and then
by requiring the government to rebut that evidence of impropriety with an adequate demonstration that the law is
necessary to the achievement of some proper governmental
purpose."'
Much of the confusion in this area stems from the Court's
methods of approach; sometimes it attempts to analyze legislative
purpose (e.g., retribution? deterrence?) and considers whether a
sanction has traditionally been labeled criminal or civil and
whether it has traditionally served to punish or regulate; the
fallacies inherent in this line of reasoning are clear. On other occasions, the Court resorts to an analysis of legislative history, an
approach generally accepted to be unreliable, 3 4 especially as a
basis for determining the constitutionality of any given rule,'
and unappropriate.
This deference to legislative history in determining whether a
sanction or a statute is criminal or civil is a gross abdication of
the judicial role. Although such an approach appears to be an
enlightened attempt to carry out congressional purpose through
statutory interpretation, it avoids the substantive question of
whether Congress has exceeded its constitutional authority. No
amount of congressional labeling should determine that . . .
question.' 3 6
It should be clear that a purposive approach to analysis of civil
and criminal offenses, though not without its uses, has limited persuasiveness. Apart from whether it is proper or accurate to
second-guess the legislature, theoretical discussions on the nature
of punishment are perhaps less coherent than is a discussion of
the nature and scope of particular sanctions. An attempt to
reconcile the contradictions in an effort to indicate guidelines for
future legislation results, first, in a discovery of three categories of
criminal punishment: "infamous" or severe sanctions have been
held by the Supreme Court to be clearly punitive, thus criminal,
whatever the label attached by the legislature. Less severe punishments are less likely to be the subject of judicial second-guessing;
133. Clark, supra note 118, at 445, quoting from Developments in the Law-Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1091 (1969).
134. Clark, supra note 118, at 441-43.
135. Id. at 384, 436.
136. Charney, supra note 117, at 494.
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they may be considered criminal by the Court if they have been
labeled criminal by the legislature, but otherwise are felt to be
civil. Very small penalties, such as fines, are presumed to be civil,
even if the legislature has labeled them criminal.' 3 7
The Court's concern with the severity of sanctions is integrally
linked with its efforts to apply, or not to apply, constitutional
safeguards in appropriate circumstances. The distinction between
criminal punishment and civil remedy is an obvious focal point,
and only by looking to specific sanctions and the circumstances in
which they are applied can a fair and comprehensible set of
guidelines be developed.
Severity alone, however, is not an adequate criterion for
distinguishing between the natures of civil and penal sanctions,
and the Court's refusal to draw such an inflexible bright line is
partly historical and partly functional.' 3 8 The notion of stigma, or
community condemnation, combines with the degree of severity to
determine where a particular sanction fits in the general legal
scheme of things.' 3 9 As a result, civil penalties are distinguishable
from criminal penalties in that civil penalties, while frequently
serving as deterrents, do not serve effectively to accomplish the
goals of retribution and moral condemnation frequently
associated with criminal punishment.4 0
The problem with this theory is that it presents a totally unworkable analytical framework. It is unclear where the courts
should look in order to determine whether the punishment embodies moral condemnation. For example, in some circles, the
acts of persons who pollute the water or the air in violation of
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act and the Clean Air Act
are regarded as immoral, yet others believe that pollution is an
inevitable byproduct of industrial and societal development-a
necessary evil."'
And, of course, attitudes not only vary but change, and there are
degrees even of moral condemnation. The interesting fact about
all this is that, though none of the proposed frameworks for
analysis-from legislative intent to degree of severity and condemnation-is satisfactory or workable, they have frequently
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Clark, supra note 118, at 383.
Id. at 404-405.
Id. at 406-407.
Charney, supra note 117, at 512-13.
Id. at 496.
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been used in conjunction with one another to provide a conglomerate foundation upon which to begin assessing individual sanctions. Though each of the proposed factors for consideration is
flawed in one way or another, their combined use has been at
least somewhat successful when brought to bear on the question
of whether a specific penalty is, under specific circumstances,
criminal or civil.
Though the death penalty is obviously a criminal sanction,
most other penalties are not as easily categorized. Even imprisonment, commonly thought of as penal, may be a civil sanction in
certain cases.' 42 Nor does the absence of imprisonment as a
penalty necessarily indicate the civil nature of an offense; in
several cases, laws that are labeled civil and do not provide for incarceration have been struck down by the courts as being penal in
nature. These borderline quasi-criminal laws provide for a
number of sanctions, from money penalties and forfeitures, to
the imposition of various disabilities (e.g., deportation) or
revocation of a license or other permission.'
The Supreme
Court in Helvering v. Mitchell noted that the revocation of a
privilege voluntarily granted is not punitive. 144 Denial or
divestiture of personal rights, however, is usually considered to
be a criminal sanction, primarily because of the obvious intent to
punish.' 4 1 In Kennedy, removal of citizenship was considered to
be a severe punishment amounting to "naked vengeance"; I'4
deportation of noncitizens, however, has been held not to be
criminal because not primarily penal. 47 The rationale involved in
allowing deportation turns on the distinction between rights and
privileges, and it only available when a person commits an
undesirable act; it cannot be used to punish constitutionally pro48
tected acts.
On the subject of forfeitures, the Supreme Court has variously
held forfeitures to be criminal,'4 9 to be neither criminal nor

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
ring).
147.
148.
149.

Clark, supra note 118, at 412, 488.
Id. at 381. See also Note, Public Torts, supra note 128, at 462.
303 U.S. 391 (1938).
Clark, supra note 118, at 390.
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 189 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurClark, supra note 118, at 390, 487.
Id. at 487.
One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693 (1965).
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punitive,5 0 and to be civil and remedial.' One line of reasoning
emphasizes the in rem nature of forfeitures and concludes that
because the sanction is directed at property and not at persons, it
is essentially remedial.' 52 The other approach emphasizes
the
53
punitive, deterrent function inherent in forfeiture.'
The line between regulation and punishment is important and
must be drawn before any given sanction can be classified confidently. If an imposed sanction represents a burden that serves a
regulatory purpose and no alternative imposing a lesser burden
exists, the sanction is more likely to be considered civil.' 5 4
Regulation, which serves a preventive function, is viewed frequently as an element of civil law, and if forfeiture involves contraband or a dangerous item, it is possible to view it as a civil
remedy, certainly more readily than would be a forfeiture of personal property in no way integral to the violation.' 55 Forfeiture of
contraband or inherently dangerous items can be justified on the
theory that there has been no deprivation of legal property interests and that regulatory interests of the state are being
served. 56 Forfeiture of goods used to commit illegal acts is
another story; though the regulatory justification may apply, the
property argument does not. If the goods are quite peculiarly
suited to the illegal activity, like burglar's tools, perhaps an argument can be made that they are dangerous to possess and so
should be forfeited. Otherwise, the preventive purpose of
forfeiture could be just as easily accomplished by the less drastic
alternative of deprivation
of the right to use similar property
15
within the jurisdiction
Both money penalties and forfeitures are more likely to be
upheld as civil if they are not disproportionate to the offense and
if they are imposed as the result of clear fault on the part of the
offender.' 5 8 Generally, with a few minor exceptions, the Court
150. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972). See also
Clark, supra note 118, at 386-88.
151. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
152. Clark, supra note 118, at 476 n.286; Edwards, Forfeitures-Civilor Criminal?,
43 TEMPLE L.Q. 191 (1970).
153. Clark, supra note 118, at 476 n.287.
154. Id. at 391 n.39, 449.
155. Id. at 475.
156. Id. at 478-79; Edwards, supra note 152, at 193.
157. Clark, supra note 118, at 480.
158. Id. at 409 n.94.
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has uniformly declined to consider either forfeitures or money
penalties to be criminal or infamous unless the proceeding in
which they are assessed bears a criminal label imposed by the
legislature. 5 9 In 1888 the Supreme Court held the imposition of a
civil money penalty to be penal,'6 yet in United States ex rel.
Marcusv. Hess,'6 ' a civil money remedy was found to be remedial.
The Court discussed the government's interest as a preserver of
peace and a protector against fraud, and said that protective
remedies were allowable, and civil, even if they involved multiple
damages. Even though punishment may be the result, that alone
was not enough to make the governing statute criminal, especially
in cases where the main purpose of the statute was to provide
restitution.' 6 2 This opinion reinforced Helvering dictum to the effect that payment of fixed or variable sums, even if severe, is not
6
necessarily penal in nature.'
Several years later, in Rex Trailer Co. v. United States,'64 the Court
allowed the award of liquidated compensatory damages in a contract action, saying that as long as the damages were reasonable,
even if actual damages were not proved, the award did not amount
to a penalty. In One Lot Stones v. United States, both forfeiture
and money penalties were upheld as providing a reasonable form
of liquidated damages for a violation and as serving to reimburse
the government for investigation and enforcement expenses. As
such, the damages were characterized as remedial sanctions,
though dictum noted that excessive penalties might change the
nature of sanctions to punitive.'" 5 The contradictory analysis of
forfeitures characterizes the Court's treatment of money sanc66
tions as well.
Several jurisdictions have attempted to decriminalize certain of their
laws, notably traffic laws. ' 67 The 1975 amendments to the Oregon
Vehicle Code purportedly decriminalized the offense of driving
while under the influence of intoxicants. In 1977 the Oregon
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id. at 392, 403, 411, 468.
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
Id. at 548.
Id.
350 U.S. 148 (1956). See also Clark, supra note 118, at 469-70.

165. One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 232 (1972) (dictum).
166. Clark, supra note 118, at 388.
167. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 19c (West 1977); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 318.13(3)
(West 1979); N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 155 (McKinney 1970) OR. REV STAT. §§
161.515(1), 161.565 (1981).
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Supreme Court held that such amendments violated article I, section 11 of the Oregon constitution, despite the legislature's good
faith efforts and intents. 68 The court specifically considered the
magnitude of the potential fine ($1,000), secondary sanctions in
the event of nonpayment (as much as thirty days in jail), the relationship of the offense to other major traffic offenses, the
legislative emphasis on the continuing seriousness of the offense
that was decriminalized, ' 69 and the retention of criminal 70enforcement procedures (arrest, detention, bail, arraignment).'
In State v. Knoles,' 7' a Nebraska case decided in the same year,
the Nebraska Supreme Court reviewed a state provision prohibiting U-turns. The infraction was labeled a civil offense, but
the court held that it was in fact criminal and that constitutional
safeguards thereby attached.'72 The court looked behind the plain
words of the relevant statute and concentrated upon the connotations of certain words that had a particular association with
criminal law. Sections specifically considered were the arrest and
custody provisions, references to guilt, and the potential for incarceration.' 7 3
A New Jersey court, in rejecting the notion of civil sanctions
for drunk driving violations, noted especially the potential thirty
days to three months incarceration provision as distinguishing the
offense from those punishable only by fine.' 74 A subsequent New
Jersey case found that motor vehicle violations were petty offenses and thus without certain rights that adhere to full-fledged
criminal prosecutions.' 75 Though a 1977 New Jersey case held
that defendants in quasi-criminal proceedings were entitled to the
basic rights of all criminal defendants, it is unclear whether this
extends to all protections or only to a selected few."76 And the
in defining and treating quasi-criminal offenses condifficulty
77
tinues.'
168. Brown v. Multnomah County District Court, 280 Or. 95, 570 P.2d 52 (1977).
169. Ludwig, supra note 124, at 605 n.19.
170. Ri. at 602-603.
171. 199 Neb. 211, 256 N.W.2d 873 (1977).
172. Id. at 876.
173. Krochmalny, Criminal Law-Traffic Infractions-Criminal Prosecution for
Civil Offenses? A Q-turn for the Nebraska Supreme Court, 12 CREIGHTON L. REv. 173,
185 (1978).
174. State v. McCarthy, 30 N.J. Super. 6, 103 A.2d 169, 179 (App. Div. 1954).
175. Krochmalny, supra note 173, at 179.
176. State v. Feintuch, 150 N.J. Super. 414,.375 A.2d 1223 (App. Div. 1977).
177. Krochmalny, supra note 173, at 180-81.
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It is interesting to note that most states have statutes that provide that all violations of the rules of the road are misdemeanors
or felonies. About nine states have attempted to carve out less
serious violations, often called infractions, to which the rules of
civil procedure are frequently, but not always, applied., 8
The legislatures' failure to specify the application of civil procedure to litigation of quasi-criminal offenses presents obvious
problems for the courts. In Oregon the new traffic code provided
for numerous criminal procedures, including arrest, detention,
and arraignment,' 79 leading the court to comment wryly on the
legislature's apparent "desire to decriminalize the procedure
rather than the offense." 180 Furthermore, the code used criminal
terminology, and the legislative history made it clear that the
decriminalization was not to be seen as a deemphasis on the
serious nature of the crime.' 8 ' In Knoles, "an enactment without
the criminal terminology may have won the day." 8' The lesson
to be learned is clear: in decriminalizing laws, an effort should be
made to specify civil procedures and to purge the statutes, as
much as possible, of traditional criminal terms and procedures.
Another consideration is to keep in mind which constitutional
protections are required in quasi-criminal proceedings. Certain
protections are clearly not applicable, e.g., forfeiture proceedings
or cases involving small crimes with minimum sentence potential' 83 may call into play the self-incrimination protection,' 84 but
not the double jeopardy protection or the various safeguards of
the sixth amendment (jury trial, right to counsel).' 5 The threat of
a severe or infamous punishment, however, may trigger all con-

stitutional safeguards.

1.86

Applicable to all punitive sanctions are the ex post facto clause,
the exception to the full faith and credit clause that concerns
enforcement of foreign penal laws, and due process rule that
tax penalties may not be assessed by summary adjudication, a
178. Id. at 174 nn.4, 5.
179. Ludwig, supra note 124, at 604 n.ll, 609.
180. Brown v. Multnomah County District Court, 280 Or. 95, 108, 570 P.2d 52, 60
(1977).
181. Ludwig, supra note 124, at 609. See also State v. Missouri Pac. Ry., 64 Neb.
679, 682, 90 N.W. 877, 878 (1902).
182. Krochmalny, supra note 173, at 182.
183. Id. at 184; Clark, supra note 118, at 398.
184. Charney, supra note 117, at 489.
185. Id. at 485; Clark, supra note 118, at 392-98.
186. Clark, supra note 118, at 401.
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currently uncertain rule that the fourth and fifth amendments
combined prevent compulsion of testimony in civil penalty
cases, the doctrine that punitive takings do not fall within the
scope of the fifth amendment's taking clause, and, finally, the
cruel and unusual punishment clause itself.'8 7
Constitutional requirements of a grand jury indictment or of
an information, and of Miranda warnings, might also be
eliminated in quasi-criminal regulations, for, as the New Jersey
Supreme Court explained, "the violations are not serious enough
to warrant time-consuming interference which would result to effective law enforcement and the expeditious administration of
justice in petty offense cases." 188 The Oregon statute, in attempting to decriminalize certain traffic offenses, tailored the sanctions
to the conduct to be regulated. Thus, though the appeal of both
state and defendant was permitted, the defendant was not permitted a jury trial, and the standard of proof required for "conviction" was lowered to a preponderance of the evidence. Violators
of the code did not suffer a disability or legal disadvantage upon
conviction; plea bargaining was prohibited, as was appointment
of counsel at public expense. Finally, the statute disallowed the
defenses of double jeopardy, res judicata, and collateral estoppel
in the event that the defendant committed a crime and a traffic
infraction at the same time.' 88
Obviously, concerns about the protection of constitutional
safeguards are well taken. The expansion of civil penalties and
procedures has been justified on many grounds in the past. One is
that the imposition of money penalties, even without the trappings of procedural safeguards, results only in the payment of
money and not in any deprivation of liberties. Civil penalties do
not subject the civil offender to any sort of disgrace or condemnation. Finally, a money penalty may often be a just and accurate
compensation to the government for monies lost or damages sustained. 9 '
Courts, in applying the various tests to the issue of criminalcivil distinction, have often developed tangential balancing tests.
The Supreme Court, in establishing a division between petty and
serious offenses, reasoned that "where the accused cannot
possibly face more than six months imprisonment, we have held
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id. at 383.
State v. Macuk, 57 N.J. 1, 9, 268 A.2d 1, 9 (1970).
Ludwig, supra note 124, at 604-605 n.l1.
Charney, supra note 117, at 501 n.136.
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that the disadvantages [to the individuals], onerous though they
may be, may be outweighed by the benefits that result from
speedy and inexpensive nonjury adjudications."' 9' There is no
question but that decriminalization of certain offenses will contribute to greater administrative efficiency and even a better protection of due process in the absence of delay and forced settlements.' 92 In some cases, the new civil remedies will serve as compensation for actual loss or liquidated damages, or as a means of
reimbursement of expenses incurred by governmental administration and enforcement.' 9 3 Lost profits may be recovered as well.* 94
Thus, while the purpose, severity, and stigma of a sanction are
considerations in determining its nature and thus its status, the
government's interest in efficiency, regulation (including taxation
and treatment), and compensation is an additional concern.' 9
The amorphous nature of many of the distinctions between criminal and civil penalties, as well as the always uncertain results inherent in balancing tests, combine to illustrate the extremely
unsettled stage at which we currently find ourselves.
IV.

Application

Though many states that have attempted to decriminalize
various traffic violations have been unsuccessful, the tribe can
profit from the guidelines suggested by the courts, and if the
penalties and procedures adhere to such guidelines and can be
seen to serve primarily a regulatory purpose, there is a good
chance that certain traffic violations, as well as other offenses,
can fall under the aegis of revised tribal codes.
Two initial determinations must be made, however, even
before revision begins. The first is whether an individual tribe
wishes to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over all Indians or only
over its own members. Oliphant did not make the distinction;
and there is no authority at the moment that makes it clear
whether a tribe may or must do so. There are perhaps equal protection problems with asserting criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians because the distinction in this instance can
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73 (1970).
Clark, supra note 118, at 381 n.6.
Id. at 466 n.255.
Id. n.256.
Charney, supra not6 117, at 408-84, 508 n.157.
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arguably be termed racial and not merely political.' 96 Nevertheless, individual tribes may wish to retain as much of their criminal
jurisdictional power as possible and so may opt to extend it to
nonmember Indians as well as members. This is a determination
that must be made by each individual tribe.
The second initial question to be answered is, of course,
whether the tribe really wishes to decriminalize any of its laws.
There are numerous factors to be considered, not the least of
which involve the current relationship of the tribe with neighboring off-reservation communities and law enforcement agencies,
and the tribal agreements, if any, with the federal and state
judicial systems. If a tribe is seriously considering revising its
code to reclassify certain criminal acts as civil, it must also face
the question of whether such a move will best serve its interests,
for, in decriminalizing activities in an effort to retain jurisdiction
over non-Indians, a tribe will necessarily have to apply the
decriminalized procedures and penalties to Indians. It would be
foolish, for example, to propose civil sanctions for a non-Indian
while retaining criminal sanctions for an Indian committing the
same offense. Once a law has been decriminalized, it will have to
be applied uniformly to Indians and non-Indians alike. If a tribe
is willing to do this and to forego the incarceration penalties in all
instances, the revision can begin.
If a tribe has retained exclusionary powers, either by treaty or
by tribal code, or both, it is reasonable to expect that such power
can be used to remove any nonmember from tribal lands. Even if
not specifically authorized, the exclusion power may still be valid
under the reserved rights doctrine. Such a power can be justified
not only on statutory grounds, and on the basis of the reserved
rights doctrine, but also may be exercised according to federal
policies that protect such an exercise of those powers necessary
for a tribe to govern itself. An exclusionary power, like the power
of deportation, may be validly exercised as a civil remedy for civil
offenses against the tribe. Any offense for which a tribe wishes to
invoke exclusion as the remedy should be defined in civil terms
and according to the guidelines set out earlier. It is, however, an
unsatisfactory remedy in many cases because it does not provide
for compensation for injuries and because it is difficult to enforce, especially if removal is exercised frequently.
196. See text accompanying note 74,.supra. Cf. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535
(1974); United States v. Holiday, 3 Wall. 407 (1865).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1981

AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 9

Regulation of such activities as hunting and fishing, business,
waste disposal, and food service is certainly one of the likely
areas in which to assert tribal civil jurisdiction. Injunctive relief,
as well as civil money penalties, could be invoked to aid in the
maintenance of peace and stability on the reservation, and could
certainly be defended by asserting tribal interest in selfgovernment and regulation.
It is possible that forfeiture provisions may be safely used to
confiscate contraband or illegally taken or illegally possessed fish,
game, wood, minerals, etc. But implements, vehicles, or other
personal property, not per se dangerous or illegally possessed,
even though used in furtherance of the offense, may be temporarily confiscated or removed from the reservation and should not
be forfeited.
Fines for offenses committed against the tribe may be effectively
used in regulating non-Indian as well as Indian activity on the reservation, especially when such behavior is clearly against the tribal interests in protecting its people and lands. Thus, hunting, fishing,
and trapping regulations were violated. Because of tribal interest
in conservation of its resources and in protection of statutory
rights, money penalties could easily be justified as a means of
reimbursement for the taking or damaging of tribal property.
Similar reasoning can be used to impose civil sanctions on those
who take or damage any tribal property, and the tribal government, as parenspatriae,could thus enforce trespassing and littering regulations.
If the theory of damages is to be compensation, the compensatory
purpose of a provision should appear on the face of it and should
provide some reference to actual cost. 97 The tribe should seek to
show the relationship between the loss suffered and the compensation sought.' 98 In contract actions, while actual damages do not
have to be accurately proved, liquidated damages must be a
reasonable approximation of the actual loss. Damages in all other
actions should be proved or provable as accurately as possible in
order to support the recovery as a civil award.'19
Though a government normally is not allowed to recover damages
on the basis of a police power interest, that is, as a result of harm
to individuals or to personal property, the tribal status as such
may allow a tribe to do so."'
197.
198.
199.
200.

Clark, supra note 117, at 468.
Id. at 471.
Id. at 473.
Id. at 472.
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Applying this body of authority, we may say that where the
government sues (1) on behalf of specific individuals, to collect
as guardian specific damages suffered by them, or (2) as parens
patriae,to collect damages to certain property interests that the
government alone can own or protect on behalf of its citizens, or
(3) in a proprietary capacity, for harm done to specific property
owns property, the
that the government owns as a private party
20
suit can be regarded as compensatory. '
Limitations on the standing to sue as parens patriae would
arguably not apply to tribes because of the communal nature of
reservation lands and properties; frequently private recoveries for
the same injury are not available, and so there is no danger of increased liability amounting to punitive damages. 0 2
From a practical standpoint, revision of parts of any tribal
code must be the result of serious consideration, study, and effort. The alternative of decriminalization is not necessarily viable
or desirable for all tribes. Initial determinations as to the scope of
the revisions must be made by a tribal council or other governing
body, and not be left to those doing the actual revising. Each
tribe has unique powers and abilities that must be taken into account before the revision even begins so that the resulting code
provisions do not extend beyond individual tribal authority. In
addition, in the actual revising process, care should be taken to
avoid all criminal and civil terminology and procedures, as well as
all penal sanctions. Because of the unsettled nature of the
decriminalization issues, there are no guarantees that any or all of
the revisions will be upheld once subjected to scrutiny; however,
the guidelines set forth in the various opinions and articles mentioned herein offer many ideas and suggestions for tribes wishing
to pursue this alternative. In the final analysis, the revisions must
stand on their own.

201. Id.
202. Id.
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